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m THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
v.
DEVON KINNE,
Petitioner.

:
:

Consolidated Supreme Case No.:
20060508-SC

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
v.
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS
Petitioner.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS KINNE AND HALLS

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S RETROACTTVITY/PRESERVATION ARGUMENT FAILS.

In the Brief of Respondent, the State indicates its position that the case of State v.
Reyes. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305, is retroactive under federal law to the petitioners cases in
this matter, but that State preservation rules apply to federal claims and preservation was thus
required in each of the petitioners' cases. Brief ofRespondent at p. 13.
A.

This Court Need Not Determine the Retroactivity of Reves.

Exceptional circumstances are explained as "those which would explain and excuse
a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah
App.1990). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to assure

that manifest injustice does not resultfromthe failure to consider an issue on appeal" State
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920,923 (Utah App. 1991).
Unlike "plain error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise
doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a
descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even
though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine
does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal.
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127. (Utah 1994\
this Court employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the
settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial.
This Court need not determine the retroactivity of the change of law set forth in Reyes
since the preservation of the issue rises to an exception under the well-settled "exceptional
circumstances" nibric here in Utah. Such a determination could potentially open the flood
gates to allow all who previously adhered to State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997)
from 1997 to 2005 to file petitions under the Act. Such a determination, however, is
unnecessary in this matter since the issue of retroactivity does not apply to Kinne and Halls,
whose trials occurred prior to Reyes, and whose appeals occurred subsequent to Reyes,
constituting a clear case for exceptional circumstances to apply.
B.

Retroactivity Does Not Require Preservation, but Clearly Dictates an
Exception to the Preservation Rule.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-35a-104(2), which is contained in the Post-Convictions

Remedy Act, encompasses the retroactivity rule here in Utah when it states that, "[t]he

2

question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United
States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's
conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles of
retroactivity." Relief is specifically excluded xmder the Post-Convictions Remedy Act,
however, as follows:
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for postconviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a
previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 7835a-107.
UTAHCODEANN.

§78-35a-106. Thus, the retroactivity rule pronounced at §78-3 5a-104(2),

as it pertains to changes in law promulgated by an appellate court with authority in Utah
clearly is reserved for those(a) who had the change of law occur after their conviction; (b)
who could not raise the issue on direct appeal; and (c) whose conviction is final.
In Griffith v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the
State's argument as to whether a change in law occurring between an individual's trial and
appeal should be entertained by the trial courts, as follows:
In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic
norms of constitutional adjudication. First, it is a settled principle that this
Court adjudicates only "cases" and "controversies." See U.S. Const., Art. Ill,
§ 2. Unlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules of constitutional
3

criminal procedxire on a broad basis. Rather, the nature of judicial review
requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the
vehicle for announcement of a new rule. But after we have decided a new rule
in the case selected, the integrity ofjudicial review requires that we apply that
rule to all similar cases pending on direct review. Justice Harlan observed:
"If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light
ofour best understanding ofgoverning constitutional principles,
it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at
a l l - i n truth, the Court's assertion ofpower to disregard current
law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the
full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that
our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in
effect of legislation." Mackeyv. UnitedStates, 401 U.S., at 679,
91 S.Ct., at 1173 (opinion concurring in judgment).
As a practical matter, of course, we cannot hear each case pending on direct
review and apply the new rule. But we fulfill our judicial responsibility by
instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet
final. Thus, it is the nature of judicial review that precludes usfrom"[s]imply
fishing one casefromthe stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of
similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule." Ibid. See
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S., at 546-547,555,102 S.Ct, at 2585,2590.
Second, selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating
similarly situated defendants the same. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.,
at 258-259,89 S.Ct., at 1038-1039 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As we pointed out
in United States v. Johnson, the problem with not applying new rules to cases
pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that results when the Court
chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance
beneficiary" of a new rule. 457 U.S., at 556, n. 16, 102 S.Ct, at 2590, n. 16
(emphasis in original). Although the Court had tolerated this inequity for a
time by not applying new rules retroactively to cases on direct review, we
noted: "Hie time for toleration has come to an end." Ibid.
In United States v. Johnson, our acceptance of Justice Harlan's views led to the
holding that "subject to [certain exceptions], a decision of this Court
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all
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convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered." Id.,
at 562,102 S.Ct at 2593.
Ibid, 479 U.S. 314, 322-324, 107 S.Ct. 708, 713, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The Griffith v.
Kentucky decision determined that this type of "retroactivity" should apply to "to all similar
cases pending on direct review." The Griffith v. Kentucky holding is upheld by Utah's
exceptional circumstances rubric and is directly in line with the Utah Legislature's
promulgation of the Post-Convictions Remedy Act.
The State's position that the invited error doctrine applies or that State preservation
rules should bar consideration of claims such as raised by the Appellants herein necessarily
creates '"the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many similarly
situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary' of a new rule." Griffith 479 U.S. at
323, 107 S.Ct. at 713, citing Johnson, 457 U.S., at 556, n. 16, 102 S.Ct, at 2590, n. 16
(emphasis in original). This Court's Reyes decision informed Reyes, Cruz and Weaver that
the holding in Robertson wasflawedand that they were thus not entitled to the benefit of the
phrase at issue herein. While the determination indirectly affected Reyes, Cruz and Weaver
by simply determining their lack of entitlement, Kinne and Halls are directly affected in that
the substantialriskthis Court discovered in Reyes exists in their respective cases. The phrase
at issue cannot be flawed for Reyes, Cruz and Weaver, but acceptable for Kinne and Halls
under the simple doctrine of equity, particularly when this Court determined that the phrase
violates Victor standards, which are the guidelines to follow after this Court's abandonment
of Robertson.
5

"The purpose of this [preservation] rule is to allow the trial court the first opportunity
to address a claim that it has erred." State v. RangeL 866 P.2d 607,611, (Utah App. 1993)
citing State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). The State attempt to
circumnavigate the holdings in Griffith by laying claim that a retroactive rule need be
preserved under State laws governing preservation; however, the State's analysis does not
include any authority for this position. Regardless, the State's argument fails based on the
fact that the retroactive rule circumvents the preservation rule by specifically stating that,".
. .failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct
review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." Griffiths. 479 U.S. at 322,107
S.Ct. at 713. The United States Supreme Court also sets forth its authority to dictate such a
holding to the State courts by stating that, ". . .we fulfill our judicial responsibility by
instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final." Id
The United States Supreme Court has held that it will not tolerate such an inequity to occur.
Id, 479 U.S. at 324,107 S.Ct. at 713. Hence, a determination that the retroactivity rule applies
is an exception to the preservation of the issue as held by the United State Supreme Court in
Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461,117 S.Ct 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that
"...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal-it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id.
Alternatively, should this Court determine that State preservation rules apply, even
in light of a determination of retroactive application, a decision to require the trial court to

6

hear the matter first prejudicially forecloses remedy for Kinne and Halls although it allows
those whose appeals have been finalized to petition for remedy. A change in law that is
constitutional does not fall under the remedies set forth in UT. R. CIV. P. 59 or 60 for
obtaining either relieffromthe judgment or a new trial. The only remedy is thus found in
the Post-Convictions Remedy Act either by filing a petition for extraordinary relief under Ut.
R. Civ. P. 65C or a writ of habeas corpus. Unfortunately, as mentioned supra, such a remedy
does not exist for Kinne and Halls.
UTAH CODE ANN.

78-35a-104(l)(a) sets forth that a challenge for obtaining a post-

conviction remedy includes a conviction that was obtained in violation of the United States
or Utah Constitutions. As articulated in Appellants' opening briefs and conceded by the
State, the change in Reyes is necessarily constitutional since it potentially diminishes the
degree by which a juror may have found a criminal defendant guilty. Although Kinne and
Halls5 cases meet this criteria and could potentially obtain relief under these provisions,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§78-35a-102 and -106 preclude them from doing so. The Post-

Convictions Remedy Act requires exhaustion of all other remedies under §78-35a-102, and
specifically requires raising the issues on direct appeal if the conviction is not yet final under
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§78-35a-106.

Kinne and Halls are precludedfromfiling under the Act under UTAH CODE ANN. 7835a-106(l)(a) since they could still raise the issue on direct appeal after Reves came down.
Interestingly, that is exactly what Kinne and Halls did to preserve their challenge. Had they

7

chosen not to raise it on direct appeal, they would have been precludedfromfiling under the
Act under subsection (l)(c) since it could have been raised but was not. Basically, the issue
for Kinne and Halls was properly raised on direct appeal according to the provisions of the
Act because they were still able to do so when Reyes came down. If this is the case, then
some exception to the preservation requirement must exist. The exceptional circumstances
rubric exists as that exception and has been routinely applied in circumstances similar to this,
where the law changed between the time of trial and time of appeal.
Additionally, a decision from this Court affirming the Utah Court of Appeals could
potentially foreclose Kinne and Hallsfromraising the matter in any post-judgment petitions
on the basis that the claim has already been determined by the Utah Court of Appeals. UTAH
CODE ANN.

78-35a-106(l)(b). However, the Utah Court of Appeals in essence declined to

address the issue, erroneously applying an incorrect exception. Thus, Kinne and Halls would
not have a remedy in filing a post-judgment motion after such a decision by this Court.
Should this Court determine that the Utah Court ofAppeals correctly applied the plain
error doctrine rather than exceptional circumstances rubric, Kinne and Halls will be
precluded from obtaining a remedy available to all others who have exhausted their direct
appeals prior to the Reyes determination being handed down, under a retroactivity argument
thus unavailable to Kinne and Halls because ofthe fact that their trials occurred before Reyes
and their appeals occurred after it. This is the entire purpose behind the appellate courts'
application of the exceptional circumstances rubric for times when the law clearly changes

8

after the time of trial but before an appeal. The only viable answer is tofindthat exceptional
circumstances apply.
If this Court were to rule that Reves should be applied retroactively it would open the
flood gates for anyone who had been convicted under Robertson which was precedent for
over nine (9) years, to now bring an action to set aside their judgments because Reves
overruled Robertson and is being applied retroactively. The State acknowledges this point
in the Brief ofRespondent at p. 8. However, anyone with a case pending on direct review
when this Court issued its decision in Reves should be allowed to benefit from the change
in the law.
Retroactive application of new laws occurs to protect the rights of those who have
previously been held to the now-abandoned holdings. In the instant matter, many people
have been subjected to reasonable-doubt jury instructions under State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d
1219 (Utah 1997) overruled in relevant part by State v.Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305,
which led to the substantial risk that they were found guilty based upon a standard that is
lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Allowing Reves to be applied retroactively
would allow every person ever convicted under a reasonable-doubt jury instruction as set
forth in Robertson to file post-judgment motions for relief. This would not allow for the
efficient administration of justice because courts would be inundated with people asking for
their cases to be reviewed based upon the retroactivity of Reves. Therefore, this Court
should decline to address the retroactivity of the holdings in Reves..

9

The exceptional circumstances rubric should be applied to the instant matter.
Exceptional circumstances are explained as 'those which would explain and excuse a party's
failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah
App.1990). In State v.Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.1992), the Utah Court of Appeals
employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled
interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial.
II.

THE; INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY.

In the Briefof Respondent, the State argues that Kinne and Halls did not preserve the
issue of the reasonable doubt jury instruction and that the invited error doctrine bars them
from obtaining relief on appeal. Brief ojRespondent at p. 16.
A.

The Issue of Invited Error is Not Properly Before This Court.

Appellants respectfully request that this Court decline to address the State's "invited
error doctrine" argument set forth in their brief at pp. 16-20 since the question is not properly
before this Court. The question upon which this Court granted certiorari is whether the Utah
Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the decisions challenged herein for "plain error." The
State has not properly challenged the issue, by cross-petition, that the Utah Court of Appeals
erred by not applying the "invited error doctrine." Thus, their claim should be barred.
B.

Alternatively, the Invited Error Doctrine Does Not Apply to Cases Where
A Change of Law Occurred Between Trial and Appeal.

10

To the extent that this Court determines that the granting of certiorari on whether the
Reyes determination constituted "reversible error" authorizing the "invited error doctrine"
argument raised by the State, Kinne and Halls address the issue herein below.
"The invited error doctrine prevents a partyfrominducing action by a court and later
seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error." U.S. v. Edward J.. 224
F.3d 1216, C.A.10,2000, citing United States v. Johnson. 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 n. 2 (10th
Cir.1999). "We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error."State v.
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). There we explained that this rule, known as the
"invited error" doctrine, serves two purposes. "First, it fortifies our long-established policy
that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error. Second, it
discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden
ground for reversal on appeal." Id. State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, (Utah, 1996) citing
State v.Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). "While the invited error doctrine is crafted to "
'discourage [ ] partiesfromintentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden
ground for reversal on appeal,'" it is also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity
to address the claim of error." State v. Geukgeuzian 2004 UT 16 f 12,86 P.3d 742, quoting
State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d
1107,1109 (Utah 1996) (further citation omitted).
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Although it appears Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue of
invited error as it pertains to unsettled areas of law, federal caselaw provides guidance. The
federal courts have expanded upon the concept of exceptional circumstances to include a
<4

plain error" concept at the stage ofappeal The United States Supreme Court explained in

Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461,117 S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that
"...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal—it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id. The
United States Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's
inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were
plainly supported by existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. United
States v. Retos. analyzed this issue and explained that the question at issue here is not
whether the error was plain at time of trial, but whether it is plain based on current law at the
time ofdirect appeal. 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies
Transport. Inc.. the Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the doctrine of invited error as
it applies to jury instructions and found that "...where a defendant submits proposed jury
instructions in reliance on current law, and on direct appeal that law is declared
constitutionally infirm, we will not apply the invited error doctrine." 127 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir.
1997). Kinne and Halls respectfully request that this Court similarly decline to apply the
"invited error doctrine" to this matter.

12

The invited error doctrine exists so that a defendant cannot intentionally lead a trial
court into committing an error and then use the error on appeal to have the conviction
reversed. In the instant matter, Kinne and Halls did not, and could not have intentionally
invite the error. At the time of their respective trials, no error existed and the reasonabledoubt jury instruction was well-founded upon existing precedent set forth in Robertson. An
attorney can only rely on current case law at the time of trial. An attorney cannot be expected
to make a long list of objections opposing ideas that are clearly supported by the existing
precedent. The invited error doctrine exists to protect from errors that are intentional at the
time of trial, not those founded in existing precedent that changes later while their appeal is
pending. Kinne and Halls had no control over whether this Court would overturn Robertson
thereby rendering the reasonable-doubt jury instruction used at their trial flawed. Since no
error existed at the time of trial, they could not invite the error.
III.

KINNE AND HALLS' TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO
KNOW THAT ROBERTSON WAS VULNERABLE AND MAY BE
OVERRULED.

In the Brief of the Respondent the State attempts to argue that no exceptional
circumstances exist in this matter because trial counsel should have known that Robertson
was vulnerable based upon the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Statev.Reves 84 P.3d 841
(Utah App. 2004), which upheld Robertson, but was then pending on grant of certiorari
before this Court. Brief ofRespondent at p. 28.

13

In the first Reyes matter before the Utah Court of Appeals, the State asked the Court
of Appeals to overrule Robertson arguing that the three-part test as set forth by this Court in
Robertson was not based on constitutionality and diminished the significance. The Court of
Appeals ruled that it did not believe that Robertson was in accordance with the precedence
set forth in Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1,114 S.Ct 1239,127 L.Ed.2d.583 (1994), but that
it did not have the authority to overrule Robertson. It reversed and remanded the matter for
a new trial. On May 26, 2004, the State then filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari
challenging the first Reves decision, which was subsequently granted by this Court.
Although Kinne and Halls' trials occurred after certiorari was granted in Reyes. Kinne
and Halls9 trial counsels could not have objected and used that information as a basis, since
pending cases have no precedential value. Had Kinne and Halls' trial counsels objected
based upon a case that was pending in this Court, the trial court would not have delayed the
decisions it made at trial in order to see how the appeal in Reyes turned out. The trial court
would have likely made the same decisions because, at the time of trial, Robertson was still
precedent.
The trial court was not going to predict the outcome of a pending case, supporting the
case lawfromthis Court and the Utah Court of Appeals that an individual is allowed to take
up on appeal an issue that was created by a change in the law from the time of trial to the
time of appeal under exceptional circumstances. "[T]he 'exceptional circumstances1 rubric
[may be employed] where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law color[s] the

14

failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex rel. T.M.. 2003 UT App. 191, f 16,73 P.3d
959, citinz State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5,10 (Utah CtApp. 1996). To do otherwise would create
the 'Virtually useless laundry lists of objections" as discussed in Johnson v. United States.
520 U.S. 461,468 117 S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Because pending cases
have no precedential value, Austin's trial counsel had no duty to know that Robertson was
vulnerable and could possibly be overturned by this Court.
IV.

THE ROBERTSON TEST DIMINISHED THE STATE'S BURDEN AND
WAS NOT FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE

In the Brief of Respondent, the State attempts to argue that the three-part test as set
forth in Robertson raised the State's burden ofproof making it more beneficial to Kinne and
Halls than harmful. Briefof Respondent at pp. 7-8. In the Brief of the Respondent the State
also attempts to argue that Robertson is more favorable to the defense. Brief of Respondent
at p. 30. The State boldly, yet mistakenly takes this position absent supportive case law and
analysis. In the process it completely ignores this Court's analysis in Reyes.
In this Court's decision in Reves it discussed how the Robertson test and the phrase
"obviate all reasonable doubt" diminished the state's burden, as follows:
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree ofproof
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. The
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the identification
of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence.
This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to
the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the
doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however,
condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to
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articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that
the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis
to acquit.
Reyes 2005 UT 33, ^27. If a juror had a doubt and could weigh that doubt against the
evidence to determine if the evidence could extinguish the doubt, it would allow the State to
have a diminished burden because it would not have to prove the charges "beyond a
reasonable doubt." For the State to meet the burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt" a juror
cannot have any reasonable doubts. If a juror is allowed to dispute a doubt's merits, then the
State has not met their burden ofproving the crime "beyond a reasonable doubt." Therefore,
Robertson actually diminished the burden of the State in having to prove a crime or act
occurred "beyond a reasonable doubt" by allowing a juror to have a doubt and dispute its
merits in an attempt to "obviate" it. The Robertson instruction clearly did not raise the
burden on the State, as the State would have this Court believe.
In Reyes, this Court articulated that using the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt"
carried with it the substantial risk that a juror could convict someone based upon a standard
that was lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid, 2005 UT 33, f30. Creating
a substantial risk that an accused could be convicted based upon a standard that is lower than
that of beyond a reasonable doubt is not defense favorable because this could allow an
accused to be convicted based upon a lower standard. Therefore, Robertson was not defense
favorable.
V.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT ENCOMPASS THE PLAIN
ERROR STANDARD
16

In the Briefof the Respondent the State attempts to argue that, if this Courtfindsthat
exceptional circumstances apply, two of the three prongs of plain error also apply. Briefof
Respondent at p. 8, 31.

The State erroneously attempts to change the exceptional

circumstances rubric as it applies in Utah by including two of the three prongs of the plain
error standard in an attempt to make it apply. Their argument fails, however, in their
concession that one of the prongs clearly cannot apply.
Plain error and exceptional circumstances cannot exist together. "Unlike "plain
error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed
in terms offixedelements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's
judgment that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error
doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration
of the merits of the issue on appeal." State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8, (Utah App.,1996)
(emphasis added). Exceptional circumstances is what exists when the plain error doctrine
cannot be met, yet an error still exists, therefore, they cannot exist as one and the same.
"In general, to establish the existence ofplain error and to obtain appellate relief from
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i)
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State
v.Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201(Utah,1993), see State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989);
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State v.BelL 770 P.2d 100,105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913,919-20 (Utah
1987); State v.Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042,1048 (Utah 1984); see also Eldredge. 773 P.2d at 3536;cf. UTAHRJEVID. 103(d); UTAHR.CRIM.P. 19(C). If any one of these requirements is not
met, plain error is not established. Cf State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992);
Vgrde,770P.2datl23.
The State concedes in its brief that the second prong of the plain error doctrine cannot
be met because the error was not obvious to the trial court. Brief of Respondent at p. 31.
Because the second prong requires that an error be obvious to the trial court it can never be
met in circumstances were there has been a substantial change in the law between the time
of trial and the time of appeal since there was no error at the time of trial. The State contends
that the first and third prong of the plain error doctrine can still be met, however, as stated
above in Dunn, if all three prongs of the plain error doctrine are not met, plain error has not
been established.
Not only can the second prong not be meet but neither can the first and third prong of
the plain error doctrine. The first prong requires that an error exists at the time of trial, no
error existed in this matter at the time of trial. No error existed in these matters until the
change in the law under Reyes. The third prong can also not be meet because the harm in
this matter is the substantial risk that was created by using the phrase "obviate all reasonable
doubt" and it is impossible to see what the potential effects of this phrase had on the juror's
minds. Therefore, none of the three prongs of the plain error doctrine can be met in this
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matter so exceptional circumstances clearly applies and the trial court erred in making its
determinations based upon the plain error standard.
The Utah Court of Appeals applied the Utah plain error doctrine when it rendered its
decision in this matter, rather than the Utah exceptional circumstances rubric argued supra,
or the federal plain error standard on appeal as set forth in Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S.
461,117S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). In Johnson, the United States Supreme
Court stated, that "...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the
law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate
consideration." Id. The use of the word "plain" in Johnson does not require an undertaking
of Utah's three-prong plain error doctrine. Instead, determining what plain error may exist
at the time of appeal requires a two-step undertaking. First, did the law change and, second,
did the change in the law create an error. The second prong in Johnson only requires that an
error was created based upon a change in the law at the time of appeal, not at the time of trial.
Because the reasonable doubt jury instruction standard did change between the time of
Austin's trial and his appeal and because the change in that law created an error, this error
should be reviewed under the Utah's exceptional circumstances rubric and the test as set
forth in Johnson. Because the three prongs of Utah's plain error doctrine have not been met,
plain error does not exist. Hence, as argued further below, harm is not required to be
established.
VI.

HARM IS NOT NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE ERROR
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In the Brief of the Respondent the State argues that if this Court determines that
exceptional circumstances apply to this matter, that the third prong of the plain error test
relating to harm also applies and that Kinne and Halls have not shown the harm in this
matter. Brief ofRespondent at p. 8. Although such a showing is unnecessary as it pertains
to the preservation rule, the harm in this matter obviously occurred in use of the phrase
"obviate all reasonable doubt," which created a substantial risk that a juror would convict
based upon a standard of that which is below "beyond a reasonable doubt." The risk creates
and evidences the harm since no one can place themselves inside the jury's minds.
No one is capable of accurately predicting if a jury attempted to weigh doubt against
the evidence in order to overcome a doubt, or if they were actually convinced that the
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kinne and Halls committed the crimes
charged. Our judicial system stands for the proposition that it is better that a guilty man go
free than an innocent man be punished for a crime he did not commit. It is thus better to err
on the side of caution and hold that, if the phrase carries a substantial risk with constitutional
implications, it does not belong in the courtroom. Because the phrase "obviate all reasonable
doubt" carried with it a substantial risk that Kinne and Halls were convicted based upon a
standard below beyond a reasonable doubt, no additional harm need be evidenced.

VII. REYES COMPLETELY OVERRULED ROBERTSON
In the Brief of Respondent, the State attempts to argue that this Court9 s ruling in Reyes
only overturned the Robertson test and not the jury instruction as set forth in Robertson.
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Brief of Respondent at p. 8. Such a determination undermines this Court's decision in Reves.
At the time of the decision in Robertson, the jury instruction given was acceptable
because this Court found that it adequately conveyed the message of "obviate all reasonable
doubt" to the jury, even though it did not use that specific phrase. This Court decided in
Robertson that the jury instructions needed to convey the idea that the State must "obviate
all reasonable doubt." This Court's decision in Reyes overturned the three-prong test portion
of Robertson as it specifically pertained to the idea coined with the phrase at issue herein,
hence the instruction which conveyed the same idea would necessarily be flawed as well.
The decision in Reves could only correct the error in the law that was created based upon the
decision in Robertson. That error of law encompasses both the test and the instruction since
both conveyed the idea that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt."
This Court cannot go back sua sponte and give Robertson a new trial based on his
instruction. Reves was not asking to use Robertson's instruction in his matter, but was only
asking for the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" be used at his trial because the first
prong of the test in Robertson indicated that this phrase needed to be used. The State's
argument that Reyes did not overturn Robertson's instruction and therefore his reasonable
doubt jury instruction is sound makes it appear as though every reasonable doubt jury
instruction that has ever been upheld by an appellate court is a sound instruction because they
were not specifically addressed by Reves. Reves completely overturned Robertson even
though it did not specifically address his reasonable doubt jury instruction, which at the time
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of his appeal and trial was issued under current law. If Robertson feels as though his
instruction is incorrect, then it is his duty to bring that issue before the court, not for this
Court to address that issue in Reyes or herein.
VIII. NO ARGUMENT NEED BE ARTICULATED TO CREATE THE
SUBSTANTIAL RISK SINCE IT IS INHERENT IN THE USE OF THE
PHRASE.
In the Brief of Respondent the state attempts to argue that "the prosecutors did not
argue that a reasonable doubt must be defined before it could serve as a basis for an
acquittal." Brief of Respondent at p. 8. The State also cites to the language included in
Reyes by this Court that states, "to the extent that the Robertson obviate test would permit
the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test works
to improperly diminish the State's burden." Reyes at ^[28. Brief of Respondent at p. 11.
In the instant matter, although the State did not argue that it need only obviate doubts
that were sufficiently defined, the language instructing the jury that 'the State must obviate
all reasonable doubt" was given and this permitted the State to make such an argument.
Because this Court in Reyes determined that the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt"
created a substantial risk, the State did not have to make the argument that they need only
obviate doubts that were sufficiently defined because the "obviate all reasonable doubt"
phase permitted them to do so. Because Robertson permitted the State to make this
argument, this Court overturned Robertson. Therefore, the State did not need to make the
argument that the jury obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, because the phrase
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"obviate all reasonable doubt" in the jury instruction created the risk that they could do just
that. Theriskis in the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt," so by having theriskyphrase
in the jury instruction permitted the State to make that argument and the Reves decision only
required that it create a situation in which the State can make that argument, not necessarily
that they will.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Kinne and Halls respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this 15th day of February, 2007.

Andrew A. Fitzgeralcf^
Attorney for Franklin Eric Halls and Devon Kinne
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of February, 2007,1 mailed, first class postage
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

23

